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LIGHTING THE FLAME OF DISORDER:
AYAN INFIGHTING AND STATE INTERVENTION IN
OTTOMAN KARAFERYE, 1758-59*

The aim of this paper is to discuss the state intervention during 1758-59 to restore order in the town of Karaferye (Veroia in Greek), center of a *kaza* in the *sancak* of Salonika. That discussion, in turn, illuminates the role of the *ayan* in the Ottoman provinces and shows that the actions of even minor *ayans* could upset not only local life but also the state authorities. Eventually an analysis of comparable cases from other areas could establish a pattern, demonstrating both how the state dealt with disruptions of order in the provinces and how its efficacy can be evaluated.

Our information about the incident in Karaferye comes primarily from one of the *sicil* volumes of the town's Islamic court, in which were registered incoming orders and locally issued documents. Reports of the Venetian consul in Salonika provide supplementary accounts, although the *sicils* of that city contain no information about the affair despite the significant involvement of the *sancak* authorities.¹ In this case, the *kadı* of Salonika must not have been among the addressees of state documents because Karaferye lay beyond his immediate jurisdiction. The sources that set the limits of our knowledge about the incident cover the period from November 1758 to June 1759, with a gap between mid-February and late March 1759. Neither the state documents nor the consular reports supply a detailed account of the events but focus on the state's reaction to the problem.

The Venetian consul noted in a report dated 27 October 1758, that a civil war between two *ağas* of Veroia had been raging for several weeks.² State documents also refer to a conflict (*kavga*, *cidal*, *mücadele*, *muhasama*) among the *ayan* of

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1. There is only a passing remark about the need to appoint a *mütesellim* (deputy governor) because the new *paşa* of Salonika was still in Karaferye: Selanik Sicilleri, vol. 94, pp. 78-79 (10 June 1759). The year of all *sicil* entries and documents cited is 1759 unless otherwise stated.

2. K. Mertzios, "Sympleroma eis ta 'Mnemeia Makedonikes Historias,'" *Eis Mnemen K.I. Amantou* (Athens, 1960), p. 59. The consul also mentions similar conflicts in Yenice-i Vardar (Yannitsa) among Janissaries and in Siroz (Serres).

Karaferye and identify the two most important figures in this clash as Kara Ahmed and "his enemy" (*aduv*) Molla Mustafa. Even though the formulaic expressions used in the sources do not allow for a detailed analysis of the impact of the conflict on the town and the surrounding area, it becomes obvious that everyday life was gravely disturbed (*katl-i nüfus ve gasb-i emval ve ihtilal-i nizam*).³ The people of the *kaza* submitted petitions to the state, and the authorities intervened to defend their suffering subjects (*fukara-yi ahali ve reayaya türlü türlü cevr ü eziyet ve isal ü hasaret eylediklerine binaen*) and restore order (*tahsil-i nizam*).⁴ The *ayan* leaders, who were promptly denounced as tyrants, rebels, and brigands (*mütegalib eden[ler], eşkiya, şekavetpişe[ler]*), found themselves the subjects of government orders to be discussed below.⁵ It must be said, however, that they apparently had never intended to attract the attention of the state, let alone to rebel against it. Instead, the factional leaders had wished to carry out their operations "discreetly" and legally, and not to be outlawed.

Essentially, the problem appears to have been administrative and fiscal abuses in the context of a struggle for local power.⁶ One office around which the problem revolved was the *voyvodalık*, an indication of its increased importance in local life in the eighteenth century. The voyvoda of Karaferye was the tax farmer of the *mukataa* of the region, as well as the *de facto* governor. Karaferye was an imperial *hass*, or private holding, that was farmed out as *malikâne*, a life-tenure hereditary tax farm. The *malikâne*-holder subsequently sublet the *mukataa* on a yearly basis to a holder called voyvoda. The voyvoda, therefore, was not a government agent; he

3. The terms *fitne* and *fesad*, meaning "sedition" and "disorder," are also used to describe the situation.

4. The same sequence of actions may be observed in numerous other cases. A petition against Kara Ahmed is discussed a little later, while Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi (B.O.A.), Rumeli Ahkam Defterleri (hereafter RAD) defter 14/no. 861 and RAD 14/869, also discussed later, refer to the dismissal of Molla Mustafa following complaints of the Karaferye population. For the important place of justice and the protection of the empire's subjects from oppressive officials in state ideology, see Cornell Fleischer, "Royal Authority, Dynastic Cyclism, and 'Ibn Khaldunism' in Sixteenth-Century Ottoman Letters," *Journal of Asian and African Studies* 18 (1983): 198-220, esp. 201-202; Halil İnalçık, "Adâletnâmeler," *Belgeler* 2 (1965): 49; Norman Itzkowitz, "Men and Ideas in the Eighteenth-Century Ottoman Empire," in Thomas Naff and Roger Owen, eds., *Studies in Eighteenth-Century Islamic History* (Edwardsville and Carbondale, IL, 1977), p. 25. See also Bistra Cvetkova, "Recherches sur le système d'affermage (*iltizam*) dans l'Empire Ottoman au cours du XVI^e-XVIII^e s. par rapport aux contrées Bulgares," *Rocznik Orientalistyczny* 27 (1964): 130-31, for the dismissal of a *muhesib* in Siroz in 1728 after complaints of the local people against him. Koca Mehmed Ragib Paşa, grand vezir at the time of the incident, was particularly harsh toward oppressive officials and *ayan*.

5. Terms and excerpts come from Karaferye Sicilleri (hereafter KS) defter 81/microfilm exposure 3/page 368/entry 2, KS 81/16/2 (1758), KS 81/20/230/3.

6. One accusation against several individuals, including Molla Mustafa and his accomplices Ramiz Efendi and Arnavud Hasan Ağa, as well as against Kara Ahmed's brother, Elhac Mehmed Ağa, was the illegal transformation of *vakıf* villages of the *kaza* of Karaferye into *çiflik*s: RAD 14/939, RAD 15/1164 (1760).

was an individual who held administrative power through his involvement in the tax-farming system. The fact that he was included among the addressees of state decrees suggests that the state acknowledged his contribution to provincial administration. So, too, does the urgency with which replacement voyvodas were appointed after the dismissal of the proper ones in the case under examination. The affairs of the *kaza*, in particular those involving collections in money or kind for the state, apparently could not wait.⁷

The first of the two principal figures, Kara Ahmed, was the subject of the state documents issued between November 1758 and February 1759, but from April onwards Molla Mustafa became the target. While there are two separate sets of decrees and the two "rebels" were dealt with independently, they were related to each other, and their unlawful actions formed part of the same incident, as did those of other persons. Among the others was Ahmed's brother Mustafa, who is cited as his collaborator. Another brother, Elhac Mehmed Ağa, appears not to have been involved in this particular case, despite cooperating with Ahmed in several other ventures over a number of years. Molla Mustafa's most prominent associate was Ramiz Mehmed Efendi, a former professor in the imperial *medreses* of Edirne and an important landholder of Karaferye. All five were counted among the regional *ayan*. Kara Ahmed's name, in particular, appears quite often in the Karaferye *sicils* of the third quarter of the eighteenth century. Molla Mustafa was from Sargöl (Ptolemais) but was obviously interested in developments in and the resources of a richer district.

The state authorities moved in two directions to restore order. One was to punish those involved in the power struggle and the oppression of the local population; the other was to render the local administration operational again. The state ordered that Kara Ahmed and Molla Mustafa be sent to the fortress of Kavala in eastern Macedonia, while Ramiz would be detained in Mağusa (Famagusta), Cyprus. Ahmed's brother Mustafa had already fled to Alasonya (Elassona) when the first available order was issued, and the authorities appear not to have given any concrete instructions about him. Other minor figures were also to be banished. The implementation of the penalties was initially entrusted to Mehmed Paşa, governor of Salonika, who sent a special agent to Karaferye. Later, responsibility was transferred to his counterpart in Köstendil, Abdi. After both failed to apprehend any of the "rebels," the state compromised by keeping the fugitives outside the *kaza* borders, or at least in hiding. Responsibility thus was transferred once again, this time from the state agents to the local community, which was forced to undertake collective responsibility for preventing those involved in the affair from ever re-entering the *kaza*, or pay a heavy fine. The second task, the restoration of administrative order, was connected primarily with the appointment of a voyvoda.

7. For more information about the voyvoda of Karaferye, see Antonis Anastasopoulos, "Imperial Institutions and Local Communities: Ottoman Karaferye, 1758-1774," unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Cambridge University, 1999, pp. 38-43. See also Halil İnalçık, "Centralization and Decentralization in Ottoman Administration," in Naff and Owen, eds., *Studies in Eighteenth-Century Islamic History*, pp. 35-36.

As indicated, in the first phase of the affair the state dealt with Kara Ahmed. According to a *ferman* issued in early November 1758, Kara Ahmed and his men had already fled in "cowardly" fashion to Karaferye, while his brother Mustafa had sought refuge with the voyvoda of Alasonya. It was pointed out that the punishment of Ahmed, who here is called *şaki*, was an imperative religious duty and that he should be arrested and sent to Kavala. The state, however, took only one practical measure toward his arrest. It ordered the people of Karaferye to submit a document ratified by the *kadı*, according to which they would be collectively fined if they permitted Ahmed to return to the *kaza* without arresting him and turning him over to the paşa of Salonika. The *ayan* and officers of Karaferye specifically were warned that not only would they be made to pay the fine, but they would also suffer other unspecified penalties should they fail to arrest Kara Ahmed upon his return. As for Ahmed's rival, Molla Mustafa, he remained as acting voyvoda, for someone needed to take care of the affairs of the *kaza*, and Mustafa had held the same post previously, as well. Nevertheless, he was to dismiss all except "five or six" of his Albanian troops.⁸

Unfortunately, the sources do not reveal who held the *voyvodalık* before Molla Mustafa took over as acting voyvoda. Kara Ahmed is cited only as an oppressive *ayan* "whose ambitions lit the flame of disorder and strife" (*ayanlık iddiasıyla...cevr ve eziyet, ikad-i naire-i fitne ve şıkak eden*), not as a dismissed voyvoda, yet he may well have been one. In fact, we know that Ahmed had held the *voyvodalık* at a certain point and, along with his brother Elhac Mehmed, had held as well the *mukataa* of the *cizye* (the poll tax on *zimmis*, or non-Muslims). This information comes from an *arzuhal*, or petition, of the people of Karaferye (*ahali ve reaya fukarası*) that bears no date but, from internal textual indications, may be dated November 1758. In the petition, the people complained that the two brothers had collected illegal amounts of money with the endorsement of the "corrupt" (*mürtekib*) *kadı* of Karaferye. Their abuses included collecting almost three times the usual amount of local taxation, imposing illegal fees, and collecting the *cizye* at a single rate instead of at three graded rates. As a consequence, the population was fleeing the *kaza*. The people alleged that two earlier *arzuhal*s had brought no result, apparently because the two brothers had connections with figures in Istanbul, such as Derviş Efendi, an official formerly in charge of the sipahi corps payroll (*sabika sipah kâtiibi*) and in-law of a former grand vezir.⁹ The Porte ordered in its reply to the *arzuhal* that the two brothers be arrested and tried, but we do not have any information as to the actual outcome of the petition.

Because the petition is undated, it is not possible to say that it was directly connected with the events of 1758-59. The fact that the *ferman* of November 1758

does not refer to Elhac Mehmed indicates that it is not. We may well assume, though, that Ahmed had somehow managed either to cling to or to regain the *voyvodalık* and that by late 1758 similar complaints had been submitted against him once more. When he was dismissed and outlawed, a replacement was found in Mustafa, whose enmity with Ahmed and Mehmed was of long standing. As early as 1755-56, Molla Mustafa, while still an *ayan* of Sarıgöl, had denounced the two brothers as patrons of the brigands who had attacked several itinerant merchants, and he had demanded their punishment in accordance with the *şeriat*.¹⁰

In any case, on 7 January 1759, a *hüccet* was issued in response to the *ferman* of November 1758.¹¹ This is the first of three similar documents entered in the Karaferye *sicil*. Ninety-three persons, representing twenty-three *mahalles* of Karaferye, undertook on behalf of the whole town the obligation to pay 10,000 *kuruş* to the *beytülmal* (public treasury) if they tolerated the return of Ahmed to Karaferye. There were four representatives from each *mahalle* and only five from the Muslim *mahalle* of Kemal Bey. In all, the Muslim representatives included sixteen ağas, thirteen *ulema* (including five *imams*), seven *bases* (a generic term for "elder"), two *berbers* (one was also a *çelebi*), two *çelebis*, two scribes (*yazıcı*), three sipahis, and one person who held no title but was a "-zade" *seyyid*. The Christians bore no titles at all, so it is very difficult to say anything about them, except that there were only three priests. The *hüccet* was signed by six *şühudul-hal*, or "professional witnesses," who were efendis, ağas, and *çelebis*.¹² None of them appeared in the next *hüccet* either as a *mahalle* representative or as a witness, and it is not clear why they were set apart from the rest of the community.¹³

In the *hüccet*, whose phrasing followed the *ferman* word for word, Muslims and Christians were listed in separate *mahalles*. We cannot tell whether the separation reflected real circumstance or was made solely for administrative purposes, but it suggests segregation on religious lines. It should be added that not only is the number of *mahalle* representatives different in the other two *hüccets*; the number of listed *mahalles* also differs. For instance, the next *hüccet*, drawn up five months later, included twenty-eight *mahalles* instead of twenty-three. The discrepancy may be simply a scribal error, or it may reflect our inability to understand the principles according to which these documents were composed.

Ramiz Mehmed Efendi's turn came some time after that of Ahmed and his brother. He was on Molla Mustafa's side although his exact role in the case is not explained. He was, however, the only one dealt with by the authorities of the *eyalet* of Rumeli, according to a *buyruldu* of 1 February 1759. Unless there are gaps in the sources, the special treatment reserved for Ramiz may be attributed to his important

8. KS 81/16/2 (1758). Mustafa undersigned a document dated 23 February 1759 as "voyvoda" (KS 81/21/232/3). This is an indication that he had managed to become voyvoda of Karaferye by that date. What is strange from a palaeographic point of view is that it seems as if one *mim* is used for both "Molla" and "Mustafa."

9. B.O.A., Cevdet Tasnifi-Adliye 629. Derviş is accused of having been bribed by the two brothers in order to secure the Karaferye tax farms for them.

10. I. Vasdravelles, *Historika Archeia Makedonias, B'Archeion Veroias-Naouses, 1598-1886* (Thessaloniki, 1954), pp. 161-163 (document 184-1756).

11. KS 81/17/224.

12. See Claude Cahen, "À propos des Shuhūd," *Studia Islamica* 31 (1970): 71-79, for the *şühudul-hal* in classical Islam.

13. Actually, one of them must be the same in both *hüccets*, only that he is efendi in one and ağa in the other.

ulema status. In fact, the authorization of the *şeyhülislâm* was given for his detention in Mağusa. Whatever the case, when the *vali's* agent arrived in Karaferye, Ramiz was no longer there. In wording reminiscent of the *ferman* regarding Kara Ahmed, the arrest of Ramiz was incumbent upon the people of Karaferye, who were to be held collectively responsible for the payment of 10,000 *kurş* to the state and liable to "the most severe punishment" if they tolerated his return.¹⁴

Separate treatment was reserved for each party involved in the affair. A *ferman* issued two weeks later (16 February) and addressed to the paşa of Salonika focused on Kara Ahmed and his brother without implicating Ramiz Mehmed or anyone else. As would happen in the future, too, the Porte extended the meaning of the *hüccet* to place responsibility for the arrest of Ahmed on the entire population of the *kaza*, not just on the urban population, and to cover any disturbance of public peace as well as Ahmed's return. Furthermore, the state warned that it would collect twice the amount pledged in the *hüccet* if its wishes were not honored.

Two months after the *buyruldu* against Ramiz Mehmed, Molla Mustafa became the target of state action. A gap in the sources does not permit a full understanding of the circumstances, but we do know that Mustafa was by then *voyvoda* of Karaferye. His document of appointment (*zabt temessüğü*) by the *malikâne*-holders of the *mukataa* of Karaferye, copied in the *sicil* of Karaferye, covered the period from March 1759 to February 1760. The name of the holder of the *voyvodalık* was left blank, which was not unusual for such documents.¹⁵ Later *fermans* referred to this *temessük* as an open-named *temessük (ismi acık iltizam temessüğü)* that had been granted to him. Like Ahmed and Mehmed earlier, Mustafa also undertook the collection of the *cizye* from the *zimmis* of Karaferye. He subleased that *mukataa* from its holder for the *sancak* of Salonika.¹⁶

According to a *buyruldu* of 14 April 1759, Karaferye residents had complained to the Porte that Molla Mustafa was roaming free with a significant force of 400 Albanians and oppressing the *reaya*, undeterred by the orders about the banishment or imprisonment of those who had been involved in the *ayan* clash. The central authorities branded Mustafa a tyrant and a brigand and ordered that he be contained in Karaferye and even killed if he resisted. The authorities of Salonika were to cooperate with Abdi Paşa of Köstendil, who was charged with restoring order in Karaferye;¹⁷ several men and the *kethüda* of the paşa of Salonika were sent to assist

14. KS 81/18/225. The *hüccet* that must have been issued as a result of the *buyruldu* has not survived in the *sicil*.

15. KS 81/21/232/1. Amnon Cohen, *Palestine in the Eighteenth Century: Patterns of Government and Administration* (Jerusalem, 1973), p. 204, n. 4, notes: "The tax was to be levied on the land, which fact explains why the name of the relevant *vali* [the *vali* was the main lessee in the *eyalet* of Sidon] was often missing or else inserted only later in red ink." However, it is still not clear why the name should be left blank when the lessee was known. Perhaps such a practice facilitated transfer of the document from one person to another.

16. KS 81/9/380/1.

17. Abdi Paşa eventually reached the offices of *vali* of Anatolia, Rumeli, and Bosnia, and died in 1204 A.H. (1789-90) as *vali* of Silistre. It is interesting that in 1762, he was posted to Belgrade, where he successfully restored order; as a result, he received the title of vezir:

Abdi. The *buyruldu* confirmed that Ramiz Efendi was still at large but falsely suggested that Kara Ahmed and his brother Mehmed (not Mustafa) had been banished as a punishment for their behavior. A *kapıcıbaşı*, Osman Ağa, was appointed as state agent, and he acted as the eyes and ears of the palace through his reports to Istanbul.¹⁸ In addition, his *mübaşir* and the *kadı* of Karaferye were to compile an inventory of the assets of Molla Mustafa, which had been confiscated by the state.¹⁹

The *buyruldu* suggested that Molla Mustafa was still in Karaferye when it was issued and that the *kethüda* of the paşa of Salonika was to arrive there first. It instructed the people and authorities of Karaferye to resist and avert Mustafa's flight, but when Abdi himself reached the town, Mustafa was no longer there. According to the Venetian consul in Salonika, this resulted in tension between the authorities of Salonika and Abdi, who imprisoned the *kethüda* for notifying Mustafa of his imminent arrival. The *kethüda* was freed three weeks later, after the Porte intervened at the request of the governor of Salonika. The consul also noted that Abdi had imprisoned the *kadı* of Karaferye for collaborating with Mustafa and had had the *serdar* of the town decapitated for the same reason.²⁰ Nothing was mentioned about these developments in the *sicils*. On the contrary, the Ottoman sources indicate that Şükrü Mustafa Efendi, *kadı* in November 1758, still held the post in March 1760.²¹ The consul also connected Abdi's mission in Karaferye with cleansing the area of the Albanians who spread anarchy, but that issue did not come up in state documents until some time later.

As stated earlier, the authorities expected the population of Karaferye to contain Molla Mustafa and his irregulars in the town. That was apparently not easy. After regular troops failed to track down Mustafa, possibly because they were outsiders in a *kaza* with mountainous areas and excellent hideouts, a *buyruldu* dated 21 April ordered the recruitment against him of all the local Muslims who were able to bear arms. This constituted a case of *nefir-i âm*, or general call-up (even though it is not called this in the *sicil* entry), a step taken in emergencies. The document was addressed not only to the *serdar* and the *ehl-i İslâm*, but also to the inhabitants of the villages and of the *çiftlikler*, most of whom were Christians. It is tempting to assume that such non-Muslims, possibly in armed groups, were expected to play a part in the campaign. What seems more likely is that they were only being warned against

Mehmet Süreyya, *Sicill-i Osmani*, III (Istanbul, 1311/1893-94): 411-12.

18. KS 81/3/368/2.

19. KS 81/4/370/1. The inventory has not survived. All we know is that Mustafa had a large house and pieces of land (*çiftlikler*) in Karaferye, as well as movable goods that were to be sold in Salonika (KS 81/9/380/1).

20. Mertzios, "Sympleroma eis ta 'Mnemeia Makedonikes Historias,'" pp. 61, 63. According to the *sicil* entries, Mustafa Ağa of the second *cemaat* (division) of the Janissaries was appointed *serdar* in early February 1759 (KS 81/23/235/1). The next appointment was that of Pehlivanzade Haseki Hüseyin Ağa in late June, after the previous *serdar* had been "removed" (*ref olunub*). Seyyid Ibrahim Ağa was also appointed *serdar* in the meantime.

21. KS 81/24/870/2 (1758), RAD 15/907 (1760). It is still possible that the *kadı* was detained for a short while and then released and restored to his duties.

offering provisions or other support to Mustafa. The *buyruldu* pointed out that it was permissible to kill Muslim "rebels" when they had been disobedient to the state and ravaged the *kaza*. Threats of severe punishment for any negligence in carrying out the orders were placed at the end of the *buyruldu*, as usual. It is interesting that Molla Mustafa was not cited as a former voyvoda or even as an *ayan*, as Kara Ahmed was earlier; he was described simply as an inhabitant of Karaferye (*kasaba sükkânından*).²²

Apart from arresting Mustafa, the other pressing issue was to restore the operation of local administration and especially to appoint a new voyvoda. Final orders were expected from Istanbul, but Abdi appointed an acting voyvoda on 22 April. The *kadı* ratified the appointment, which was justified on the same grounds as that of Molla Mustafa a few months earlier: the flight of the former voyvoda had left the affairs of the *kaza* in disarray, and someone needed to supervise them.²³ The appointee was Seyyid Ibrahim Ağa, a *çavuş* of the Janissaries of the Porte, who had been appointed to the retinue of Abdi and promoted to *serdar* of Karaferye in late March.²⁴ His particular task was to ensure that order was maintained after the departure of Abdi Paşa and that those banished would not return. If the Venetian consul's report is accurate, Abdi had executed Ibrahim's predecessor.

There was a small complication in the appointment of a proper voyvoda. According to a *buyruldu* issued on 18 May, the post was allocated to an influential *ayan* of Salonika, Abdurrahman Ağa, pending ratification by the Porte.²⁵ Abdurrahman must have been Abdi Paşa's selection, as the Venetian consul in Salonika wrote in a report dated 22 May.²⁶ Other sources suggest, however, that the *malikâne*-holders in Istanbul had subleased the *mukataa* of Karaferye to Elhac Osman, a *gedikli*, or office-holder, of the Porte, for one year. A petition Osman submitted in May claimed that Mustafa had already collected a large amount of the *mukataa* revenues and that these now should be recovered with the assistance of the

22. KS 81/3/368/1. See Halil İnalçık, "Military and Fiscal Transformation in the Ottoman Empire, 1600-1700," *Archivum Ottomanicum* 6 (1980): 304-311, on *nefir-i âm*.

23. KS 81/4/369/1. The dates of issuing and of registration of the *buyruldu* coincide, which means that Abdi must have issued it in Karaferye.

24. KS 81/4/369/2, KS 81/4/369/3. His appointment is announced by a *ferman* and a letter of the ağa of the Janissaries at the Porte. Abdi Paşa is cited in both documents, which means that his appointment took place not later than 20 March.

25. KS 81/5/372/1. Abdurrahman was *baruthane nazırı* and *gümrük emini* of Salonika, as well as *mütesellim* of various pašas, and held the title of imperial *kapıcı başı*: V. Günay, "H. 1159 (M. 1746) Tarihli Karaferye Kazası Şeriye Sicili (Transkripsiyon ve Değerlendirme)," unpublished thesis, Izmir, 1993, p. 232, document 60; N. Svoronos, *Le Commerce de Salonique au XVIII^e siècle* (Paris, 1956), pp. 17-18 and 18, n. 4. Svoronos notes that the customs officer (*gümrük emini*) was the most important among the tax farmers of Salonika, while in the *eyalet* of Sidon, too, those who farmed the customs revenues of the port towns were also appointed governors and represented the *vali*'s authority (Cohen, *Palestine in the Eighteenth Century*, p. 125).

26. "Abdi returns to Köstendil....[H]e appointed customs officer Abdurrahman as his deputy and voyvoda in Karaferye" (Mertzios, "Sympleroma eis ta 'Mnemeia Makedonikes Historias," p. 64).

local court and given to Osman, whose appointment had started in March. The Porte accepted Osman's request and ordered an investigation of the accounts of Molla Mustafa. Mustafa's dismissal was a result of complaints from the local population, the petition indicated.²⁷

Osman's name was not mentioned again. On the contrary, the appointment of Abdurrahman was made official in a *ferman* dated 2 June.²⁸ He enjoyed Abdi's support and that of the local population, according to the formulas used in official documents (*cümle ahali-i vilâyetin istidasıyla...esseyyid Abdurrahman Ağa...voyvoda nasb ve tayin*). Apparently, it was believed that the *mukataa* no longer belonged to the *malikâne*-holders but formed part of Mustafa's confiscated property, for it was eventually discovered that the latter had prepaid its full value without having had time to start collecting from the local population. Consequently, the state was entitled to intervene and order the *malikâne*-holders to appoint whomever it chose as voyvoda. To avoid further complications, it was specified that no individual complaint would be accepted unless supported by a *mahzar* (decree), an *ilâm* (written judgment) of the *kadı*, and a letter from the voyvoda. The "open-named" *temessük* that was still in Mustafa's possession was declared void, and the *malikâne*-holders issued a new one specifically bearing Abdurrahman's name and clarifying that he would collect the *mukataa* revenues fairly on behalf of the public treasury.²⁹ He was obviously also allowed to collect a fee for his services, but there is no mention of such an allowance in the *fermans*. Abdurrahman probably appointed an agent (*vekil*) instead of moving to Karaferye himself.

The only evidence of Abdurrahman's *vekil* is a *tevzi defteri* (distribution register) compiled on 24 May, which includes payments to the officials involved in the incident. The name of the *vekil* was Ibrahim Efendi. Ibrahim Ağa, the *çavuşbaşı*, was also included in the *defter*, and despite having been a *voyvoda vekili* himself, he should not be confused with his efendi namesake. The total payment amounted to 4,236,000 *akçes* (35,300 *kuruş* at a rate of 120 *akçes* per *kuruş*). Abdi Paşa was allocated 42.5% of the total, Osman Ağa 28.3%, the *kethüda* of the paşa of Salonika 4.25%, Ibrahim Ağa and the voyvoda 2.8% each (as a collection fee for the latter), and Ibrahim Efendi 0.3%. The remaining amount represents expenses for provisions and fees for the court of law and the retinues of the officials.³⁰ The sum of 4,236,000 *akçes* was a very substantial amount; the expenses entered in the regular *tevzi defteri* of 1764 amounted to only 2,262,650 *akçes*. The *hazariye* tax, to provision dervish lodges for which the governor of Salonika was responsible, in the same *defter* came to 226,975 *akçes* (at least one-third of that amount must have been administrative fees), while Abdi Paşa received 1,800,000 *akçes* for his part in the campaign against Mustafa.³¹

27. RAD 14/861, RAD 14/869; Cevdet Tasnifi-Maliye 9014.

28. KS 81/11/383/1. A second *ferman* about the same matter was issued on 3 June (KS 81/9/379).

29. KS 81/12/385/2.

30. KS 81/7/375/1.

31. KS 85/6/427-9 (1765).

Abdi Paşa was appointed governor of the *sancaks* of Salonika and Kavala on 2 June 1759, apparently as a reward for his services in Karaferye, for which he was praised. He was expected to restore full order in Karaferye before departing for Salonika. The special relationship between Abdi and Abdurrahman is confirmed by the fact that the former appointed the latter as his *mütesellim* on 10 June.³² Minor appointments took place in Karaferye at around the same time (from 18 May to 25 June), marking the return to normality. They included those of a *subaşı*, a *muhtesib*, and a *bölükbaşı* with two hundred men.³³

Normality was supposedly guaranteed by two more *hüccets*. The first was drawn up on 19 May and signed by 184 Muslims and 156 Christians of the town, distributed in twelve Muslim and sixteen Christian *mahalles*.³⁴ This time, representation was not uniform but ranged from five to twenty-four persons per *mahalle*, perhaps on the basis of *mahalle* sizes. Christians, listed solely by given name, must have represented the *mahalle* leadership. (No priests are indicated while seven *imams* are cited in the Muslim *mahalles*.) Muslim titles appear as they do in the first *hüccet*, beginning with that of Rüşdi Ali Efendi, the "recognized" *ayan* of the *kaza*.

The *hüccet* of 19 May is similar to the one about Kara Ahmed. It covered Molla Mustafa, noting that he fled six days before the arrival of Abdi, as well as Ramiz Mehmed and Kara Ahmed. According to the text, the signatories undertook the obligation to pay 50,000 *kuruş* to the public treasury if any of the three *ayans* returned and was not immediately arrested. It is not known whether the extraordinarily high sum was based on an estimate of the actual financial resources of the *kaza* or set arbitrarily to terrorize the population. Signed by the urban population, the document applied to the whole *kaza* (*cümle ahali-i kazayı canib-i miriye ellibin gurus nezre ket eylediklerinde...*). This may be a testimony to the domination of the urban center over the rural areas although on other occasions the villages were independently represented. It should also be noted that Ahmed's penalty was clearly stated to be detention in the fortress of Kavala and not exile, as suggested in the *buyruldu* of 14 April.

According to the *ferman* confirming receipt of the *hüccet*, the inhabitants of Karaferye would have to pay much more than they had pledged if they tolerated the return of either of the two *eşkiya*, Ahmed and Mustafa, or of Ramiz. Furthermore, the *ferman* maintained, the population of the *kaza* had undertaken the pledge voluntarily (*bilcümle ahali-i kaza taahhüd...huzur-i ser'de bittav v'ür-rıza verdikleri hüccet*).³⁵ The Venetian consul, however, denied that claim categorically in his report of 22 May, attributing the imposition of the 50,000-*kuruş* pledge to Abdi.

Following a *buyruldu* of the *divan* of Salonika, another *hüccet* was issued on 24 June. In it, the people of Karaferye undertook to pay 5,000 *kuruş* to the public

treasury if twenty-seven listed minor accomplices of Molla Mustafa were allowed to return to the *kaza* without being arrested.³⁶ The accomplices' names seem to have been indicated by imperial *ferman*.³⁷ Fifteen were Janissaries;³⁸ Mustafa Ağa, the brother of Kara Ahmed, was also among them as were a nephew of Molla Mustafa and his two sons and two brothers from Sarıgöl. The *hüccet* contained the names of 160 inhabitants (including nine *imams*) from only the Muslim *mahalles* of the town, obviously because the offenders resided there. The representation pattern was different again. For instance, the *mahalle* of Cami-i Atık was represented by twenty-four persons in the earlier *hüccet* but by fifteen in this one; first ten, now sixteen, persons represented Su Kapısı.

At this point, the problem in Karaferye can be connected with the issue of the Albanian presence in the region. Incidentally, the Venetian consul in Salonika referred to Molla Mustafa as "leader of the Albanians" in one of his reports.³⁹ Two *fermans* issued in late May-early June 1759 treated the 50,000-*kuruş* pledge as obliging the *kaza* to be cleansed of all the Albanian brigands (*eşkiya*) who were active there and pointed out that the killing of Muslim brigands was canonically permissible in response to resistance and battle. In addition, the authorities and populations of the neighboring *kazas* (Yenice-i Vardar, Vodina, Ağustos) were ordered to expel Albanians and to assist the people of Karaferye, for, it was claimed, order could not be established until Albanians were altogether expelled from the region. The officers and *ayan* of the *kazas* received particular warnings against allowing the return of Albanians. The authorities apparently deemed the issue so important that one of the *buyruldu*s was addressed not only to the officials and the *ayan* of Karaferye but also to the Christian *kocabaşıs* and even to the village population.⁴⁰ Including the Christian majority of the *kaza* among the addressees of state decrees was extremely rare, but it happened twice--this time explicitly--in the course of this particular case.

36. KS 81/14/389/1, KS 81/15/391.

37. KS 81/11/383/2, KS 81/11/384/3. These are undated lists of names under the headings *derbeyan-i Yeniçeri eşkiyası* and *vürür ferman-i âlide mukayyed eşkayanın destidir*. Even though the lists may have been copied from a *ferman* confirming the *hüccet*, it seems more likely that the Porte was notified of the names and consequently demanded the drawing up of a *hüccet*.

38. It is specified in the *buyruldu* that not only the inhabitants of the *mahalles* but the *serdar* and the elders of the Janissaries should be bound by the undertaking.

39. According to a *sicil* entry of 1770, however, Mustafa was "Türk" (KS 91/3/850). This entry has been published by Vasdravelles, *Historika Archeia Makedonias*, pp. 184-85 (document 202).

40. KS 81/10/381, KS 81/10/382. The first entry has been published by Vasdravelles, *Historika Archeia Makedonias*, pp. 168-170 (document 189). *Buyruldu*s of the *divan* of Salonika inform the Karaferye *kaza* population of the orders for the extermination of the Albanian *eşkiya* and hold the *bölükbaşı* of Karaferye responsible for carrying out the cleansing (KS 81/12/385/1, KS 81/14/389/2). The Venetian consul in Salonika refers to *fermans* about the expulsion of the Albanians as early as mid-April 1759 (Mertzios, "Sympleroma eis ta 'Mnemeia Makedonikes Historias," p. 61). Copies of such *fermans* have not survived in the *sicil* of Karaferye.

32. KS 81/12/386/1, KS 81/12/386/2. The date of the appointment of Abdi is given as 3 June in the document appointing Abdurrahman as his *mütesellim* (see n. 1).

33. KS 81/5/372/2, KS 81/12/386/3, KS 81/14/390/2.

34. KS 81/6/373-74.

35. KS 81/9/380/2.

After 1759, as well, the Ottoman authorities dealt with the Albanians of southern Rumeli and the Peloponnese on several occasions. For instance, during a well-known campaign in 1779,⁴¹ a *ferman* specified that the central authorities would not tolerate any more Albanian *ayan* in Rumeli since their *ayanlık* ambitions already had brought chaos and anarchy to several towns.⁴² In the case of the *sancak* of Salonika, *fermans* and *buyruğdus* of late 1764 and 1765 called for the extermination of Albanian brigands who had raided the whole of southwestern Macedonia and Thessaly, and the same documents criticized the lack of respect for the orders sent to Abdi Paşa concerning the expulsion of the Albanians.⁴³ Abdi himself had been appointed *serasker* in the campaign against the Albanians in 1759, but complaints of the *reaya* had led to his removal and eventual transfer from Salonika to İnebahtı (Lepanto, Naupactos) in mid-February 1760.⁴⁴

The *fermans* dealt with others besides the Albanians. One of the two demanded that three inhabitants of Karaferye be exiled "to distant places," charging that *kaymakam nakib-i sabık* Seyyid Mehmed, Hasan *sipahi*, and *imambaşı* Elhac Ibrahim had participated in the troubles in some capacity. More important, another Albanian, Hasan Ağa, his sons, and his men were to be kept out of the *kaza* of Karaferye. Hasan, who was the *de facto* ruler of the nearby town of Katerin and also the biggest landholder in the *kaza* of Karaferye, was denounced as an associate of Mustafa. According to the document, Mustafa borrowed money from Hasan, transferred the debt to the population of the *kaza* by forcing them to sign notes of acceptance, then terrorized them for its repayment. It is not clear, however, what was to happen to the lands and the *mukataa* held by Hasan in the *kaza* of Karaferye. His control over the *mukataa* of Çitroz, in the southern part of that *kaza*, had been renewed just a few months earlier, until the end of February 1760.⁴⁵

Government activity concerning the incident *per se* ceased after the promulgation of the decrees against the Albanians and the *hüccets*, at least according to the Karaferye *sicil*. Nevertheless, repercussions of the case persisted some time after an appearance of normality returned to the life of the town.⁴⁶ In December

1759, the guilds of Karaferye claimed that a Christian family of the town, the Kritopoulos, had in their possession 15,000 *kuruş* that Molla Mustafa had given to a certain Küçük Kritopoulos in order to bribe officials in Istanbul into pardoning the molla. Allegedly, after Kritopoulos found out about the *ferman* against Mustafa, he returned to Karaferye and died without delivering the money. The guilds had a claim of 3,000 *kuruş* against Mustafa and demanded that it be paid from the Kritopoulos money. The clever claim attracted the attention of the state, which was determined to keep the remaining 12,000 *kuruş* as part of Mustafa's confiscated property. Consequently, the Porte referred the case to the *divan* of Rumeli and to the *kadi* of Karaferye and appointed an imperial *kapıcıbaşı* to collect the money.⁴⁷

The investigation that followed led to the collapse of the entire case, as revealed in a *ferman* issued in early February 1760. The people of Karaferye denounced the guilds' claim as calumny resulting from private grievances, and an examination of the inventory of Molla Mustafa's assets provides no evidence to support it, either.⁴⁸ The case does demonstrate that local competitions were still going strong in the aftermath of the *ayan* conflict: the guilds versus the *bazirgân* (merchant) Kritopoulos and the townspeople (*Karaferye ahalisi*) versus the guilds. It is noteworthy, too, that the cooperation between Mustafa and a Christian did not sound unlikely to the authorities, even if the claim proved not to be true. Apparently, a merchant with business and contacts in Istanbul was particularly useful as mediator with the central authorities. What is not known is whether Mustafa had a patron in Istanbul or not.

Mustafa's immediate fate is also not known. Some years later, in 1764, the *zimmis* of Kilindir village complained that a certain Mustafa from Sarıgöl had forcibly and illegally collected a fictitious seven-year-old debt of 600 *kuruş*.⁴⁹ According to a *defters* of 1765, Mustafa owned only a small share of land in the village of Makroğuz, but he was in a position to lead troops for the Ottoman army in 1770.⁵⁰

As for Hasan Ağa of Katerin, he submitted a petition to Istanbul in early December 1759 against rival *ayan*. The petition and the reply of the Porte did not include any reference to the decree against him. On the contrary, Hasan stressed his role as guarantor of order against brigands and other outlaws, as if he were never banished from Karaferye for terrorizing the population.⁵¹

41. On the extermination of the Albanian beys, see the contemporary reports of J.V. Arasy in M. Lascaris, *Salonique à la fin du XVIII^e siècle d'après les rapports consulaires français* (Athens, 1939), pp. 37-40. See also Svoronos, *Le Commerce de Salonique*, pp. 29-31.

42. Vera Mutafchieva, "L'institution de l'*ayanlık* pendant les dernières décennies du XVIII^e siècle," *Études Balkaniques* 2-3 (1965): 237.

43. KS 85/11/425/2 (1764), KS 85/9/301/2, KS 85/15/770/1 (1765).

44. Mertzios, "Sympleroma eis ta 'Mnemeia Makedonikes Historias,'" pp. 65-68. According to the French consul in Salonika, Abdi made two campaigns against Albanians in Thessaly and took office in Salonika only on 16 December 1759, after he had had them dispersed.

During his absence, Salonika was governed first by his *kethüda*, and then by an interim paşa: Svoronos, *Le Commerce de Salonique*, pp. 22-23 (document no. 18), 373 (document no. 161).

45. KS 81/5/372/3. The Venetian consul in Salonika reports on 19 June that Abdi Paşa is planning to pursue a certain Arnavud Paşa (sic) who is protecting Molla Mustafa. Arnavud Pasha might be a mistake for Arnavud Hasan (Mertzios, "Sympleroma eis ta 'Mnemeia Makedonikes Historias,'" p. 65).

46. Apparently, state performance in the case was not convincing enough to avert further

oppression of the population: in early September 1759, the Christian community complained again of the attempt of the *cizyedar*, Hasan Ağa, to collect the *cizye* twice (RAD 15/135).

47. KS 81/23/868/1, KS 81/23/868/2, RAD 15/473. These documents are also useful in that they state that Mustafa has not been arrested yet in December 1759 and that the mission of Abdi concerning the restoration of order in Karaferye has been terminated. The Kritopoulos family is best known as Charitopoulos, but this appears to be due to a misreading of Ottoman documents. KS 81/23/868/1 has been published by Vasdravelles, *Historika Archeia Makedonias*, pp. 170-171 (document 190), though with several mistakes.

48. KS 82/1/613, RAD 15/667 (1760).

49. RAD 21/497 (1764).

50. KS 85/17/774 (1765), KS 91/3/850 (1770).

51. RAD 15/470.

More interesting information is available about Kara Ahmed. In spring 1760, the people of Karaferye petitioned the Porte via reports of the *kadis* of Karaferye and Yenice-i Vardar, requesting that he be pardoned. According to their petition, Ahmed had repented for his past behavior and undertook not to employ Albanians again. It was claimed that Ahmed's enemy (*hasım*), Ramiz, was dead.⁵² It seems that the only effect of the pledges imposed upon the people of Karaferye had been to precipitate their reconciliation with Ahmed so that Ahmed could return to the *kaza*, and the population could be spared the danger of paying a heavy fine. The Porte, however, was reluctant to accept the request until confirmatory sealed and signed *mahzars* had been submitted directly by the Karaferye population.

Before closing, it is useful to discuss an important detail about the registration of the decrees in the *sicil*: several of the *buyruldu*s concerning the case were issued and recorded in the Karaferye *sicil* on the same day. Abdi Paşa or his subordinates must have issued those orders on the spot. The *fermans* were recorded in the *sicils* with a delay of at least eight days. The *ferman* of November 1758 dealing with Kara Ahmed was recorded two months after it had been issued, and another *ferman* was recorded with a delay of one month, but most were recorded within twenty days. Although it still is surprising that important and urgent orders required such a long time to be registered, their immediate recipients, such as Abdi, seemed to receive them much faster. For instance, the *ferman* concerning the claim of the guilds against Mustafa was issued in the first ten days of December and probably sent to the *vali* of Rumeli, who issued his *buyruldu* on 19 December; then both orders were forwarded to Karaferye and registered in the *sicil* on 27 December.⁵³

CONCLUDING REMARKS

The incident discussed in this paper was one of several in the struggle for supremacy among *ayan* in the Balkans, a major theme in eighteenth-century Ottoman history. Vera Mutafchieva cites several more examples of such clashes, the earliest being set at Razgrad in 1747.⁵⁴ Bruce McGowan also mentions competition for domination among the *ayan* of Siroz and of Vidin in the 1760s.⁵⁵ Control of the

52. RAD 15/907 (1760). A later document contradicts the claim that Ramiz was dead (RAD 24/231 [1768]). As already noted, Ahmed's "enemy" was Molla Mustafa, according to the *ferman* of November 1758.

53. Five out of seven *fermans* issued on 2-3 June 1759 were recorded in the Karaferye *sicil* on 14 June and the remaining two on 18 June. Were they received as a batch, or was their simultaneous copying in the register a coincidence?

54. Mutafchieva, "L'institution de l'*ayanlık*," pp. 236ff.

55. Bruce McGowan, "The Age of the Ayans, 1699-1812," in Halil İnalçık, ed., with Donald Quatert, *An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire, 1300-1914* (Cambridge, 1994), p. 665. See Cohen, *Palestine in the Eighteenth Century, passim.*, for the case of Zahir al-Umar in Palestine. The scale is certainly different, but there are some analogies with the case of Karaferye in terms of both notables' ambitions and state reaction to them.

local financial and productive resources was a major motive for such competitions, and both Kara Ahmed and Molla Mustafa were accused of overtaxation and financial abuses.

State control was never at serious risk in Karaferye. The issue was, rather, checking oppressive officials and notables and restoring administrative order. The oppression and collapse of order necessitated the intervention of the state, giving it an excellent opportunity to perform its role as guarantor of justice and thus reinforce its bond with its subjects. The state responded to the requests from the people for action by dispatching decrees, agents, and troops, but it proved unable in the short term to arrest any of the wrongdoers. In the long term, it was unable to avert similar phenomena or even the return of the "rebels" of 1758-59 to the *kaza*.⁵⁶ We therefore have grounds for asserting that the Karaferye incident refutes, on the one hand, any suggestion that the central government had totally lost control over the Ottoman provinces but demonstrates, on the other hand, how flawed its control was. The state did not seek to remedy the roots of the problem, which were located in the prevailing administrative, fiscal, and social structures. Rather, it adopted a symptomatic analysis of the events and acted as if replacing and banishing a few corrupt individuals could end misgovernment and oppression. In fact, because the priority of the state was to restore the uninterrupted collection and flow of tax revenues, once a new voyvoda had been appointed, the issue was considered practically settled.

If we review the steps taken, the process of restoring order in Karaferye seems to have begun with reports and petitions that rendered Istanbul aware of the situation. Subsequently, the Porte issued decrees outlawing those who had oppressed the population and had participated in the *ayan* clash, and it dispatched paşas, troops, and agents against them. This leg of the government's policy did not result in the arrest of the subjects of the decrees but only forced them to hide or to flee Karaferye. The second leg concerned administrative appointments, especially that of the voyvoda, who would supervise the smooth running of local and state affairs. As the aim of state policy changed from arresting Ahmed, Ramiz, and Mustafa to keeping them out of the *kaza*, so the responsibility for carrying out the decrees was shifted from the state to the local society by applying the familiar principle of communal responsibility.⁵⁷ The community thus became bound by legal documents, as in several other cases, and the flow of state decrees about the incident was terminated.

As noted above, the Ottoman government focused on individuals rather than

56. In 1782, Hacimehmedağazade Osman Bey, his two sons, one Osman Ağa, and twenty of their followers raided the house of the *serdar* of Karaferye and murdered him. The *mütesellim* of Salonika, an agent of the central authorities, and the *naib* of Karaferye were ordered to restore peace and order: Vasdravelles, *Historika Archeia Makedonias*, pp. 224-225 (document 235-1782).

57. See KS 72/fo1. 46r (1748), published by Vasdravelles, *Historika Archeia Makedonias*, pp. 156-157 (document 179), with several mistakes. According to this entry, the population of Karaferye undertook collective responsibility for the security of the roads and mountain passes of the *kaza*.

on institutions, but it did proceed to one generalization. That was connecting the Karaferye problem with the presence of Albanians in southwestern Macedonia. These Albanians were considered responsible for several instances of oppression and disorder in the region, and if Molla Mustafa alone were followed by 400, one can see why the state was worried about them. Once the authorities decided to use force against them, the local population had to be enlisted either to make the Albanians return to their homeland or to exterminate them. In the long run, however, the state failed again, and Albanians remained a factor in the life of the region.

Less than a year after calm had supposedly returned to Karaferye, the first attempts to negotiate the status of people such as Kara Ahmed started. Despite the Porte's reluctance, the sources suggest that Ahmed eventually managed to return to the *kaza* and regain his power and influence.⁵⁸ The claim of the guilds regarding Kritopoulos indicates that an oppressive official could reasonably expect to negotiate his place within the Ottoman system as long as he had the proper connections and patrons.

It should not be overlooked that although the abuses of the *ayan* undoubtedly were a heavy burden, the population also had to bear the very substantial cost of the state emissaries sent to alleviate the suffering of the *reaya*. Furthermore, the shift in responsibility for the arrest of those wanted from the state to the community and the subsequent imposition of the pecuniary pledges both signified that the population was in danger of paying an even larger amount of money before the case was closed. Because the menace of the fine, as opposed to the monotonous abstract threats of strict punishment, was the only concrete measure that could really contribute to the implementation of state policy, it is legitimate to ask what the local community or its leadership expected to achieve by applying to the Porte. In other words, how did they perceive their position within the Ottoman polity? To answer such questions, however, we would need to establish first what the terms "community" and *ahali* stood for in the Ottoman context, an extremely difficult task for the modern scholar.

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PASVANOĞLU OSMAN PAŞA AND THE PAŞALIK OF BELGRADE, 1791-1807*

The Serbian uprising of 1804 and the events surrounding it have been the subjects of a variety of studies, but the major figure behind them, Pasvanoğlu Osman Paşa, has been neglected by most scholars. Pasvanoğlu's revolt against the Ottoman central government began the Serbian uprising. In fact, one can state safely that Pasvanoğlu prepared the groundwork for it in the same way that Tepedelenli Ali Paşa laid the foundation for the Greek revolution of 1820. Pasvanoğlu's actions against the sultan and state-appointed officials were a turning point in Ottoman history in the sense that the local administrators, or *ayans*, achieved the full control over the community and its economic resources that allowed them to defy the authority of the central government. Pasvanoğlu achieved such firm control over the *paşalık* of Belgrade that he forced the state to arm the *reaya*--the very group that the state was supposed to rule, protect, and tax--and use them against its own representatives. In the great paradox of the situation, the state used non-Muslim subjects against its fellow Muslims, enabling the non-Muslims to seek control over their own security and economic well-being and making the Ottoman administration redundant.

Pasvanoğlu's rise to power was facilitated by issues that affected everyone in the Balkans in the last decade of the eighteenth century. Foremost was a struggle for control of the land. The *ayans* continually sought to wrest control of the land from the state, that is, to transform *miri* (state) lands into *mülk* (private property) in order to gain the right to cultivate it according to the needs of the market economy. Pasvanoğlu, who resided in Vidin near the Habsburg border, could draw great wealth from the sale of agricultural goods to his Habsburg neighbors if he could establish control over and extend his landholdings. Pasvanoğlu's acquisition of land, however, diminished the security and economic stability of the *reaya*, especially those in the *paşalık* of Belgrade.

Closely tied to the struggle for land ownership was the issue of centralization. During the reign of Sultan Selim III (1789-1807), a policy of centralization was introduced to re-impose state control over economic means.¹ Because the land was the chief economic asset, its potential master (the state, *ayan*, or other landowner)

* A prior version of this paper was delivered at the 2001 Middle East Studies Association conference.

1. For a detailed account of Sultan Selim's reign and reforms, see Stanford J. Shaw, *Between Old and New: The Ottoman Empire under Sultan Selim III, 1789-1807* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971).

58. For instance, Ahmed was expected to lead 300 foot soldiers to the war front in 1772 (B.O.A., Mühimme Defteri 171, nos. 207, 329, 403, 459; see Y. Nagata, *Muhsin-zâde Mehmed Paşa ve Ayânlık Müessesesi* (Tokyo, 1976), p. 105).

“Lighting the Flame of Disorder: Ayan Infighting and State Intervention in Ottoman Karaferye, 1758-59”, *International Journal of Turkish Studies*, 8/1&2 (2002), 73-88

Corrigenda

No.	Page(s)	It reads:	How it should be (correct form)
1	73, § 1	... establish a pattern, demonstrating both how the state dealt with disruptions of order in the provinces and how its efficacy can be evaluated.	... establish a pattern, demonstrating how the state dealt with disruptions of order in the provinces, and lead to a general evaluation of its efficacy.
2	73, § 2	The kadi of Salonika must not have ...	The kadi of Salonika was not ...
3	74, § 1	Mütegalib eden[ler]	Mütegalibeden (ablative)
4	74, § 1	Şekavetpiş[er]	Şekavetpişe
5	74, § 2	An imperial hass, or private holding	An imperial hass, or imperial estate
6	76, § 2	... iddiasıyla iddiasıyla ...
7	76, § 2	... Ahmed had held the <i>voynodalık</i> at a certain point and, along with his brother Elhac Mehmed, had held as well the <i>mukataa</i> of the <i>cizye</i> Ahmed, along with his brother Elhac Mehmed, had held at a certain point the <i>voynodalık</i> , as well as the <i>mukataa</i> of the <i>cizye</i> ...
8	76, § 2	... may be dated November 1758	... may be dated prior to November 1758
9	77, § 2	... seven <i>beyes</i> (a generic term for “elder”)	... seven <i>beyes</i> (a title usually suggesting janissary connections)
10	77, § 2	... <i>şühudul-hal</i> , or “professional witnesses” <i>şühudul-hal</i> , or “organic [notarial] witnesses” ...
11	78, § 3	... “ismi açık ...”	... “ismi açık ...”
12	81, § 2	... <i>istidasıyla</i> <i>istidasıyla</i> ...
13	81, § 2	... a <i>mahzar</i> (decree), a <i>mahzar</i> (round robin [collective petition]), ...
14	81, § 3	... the <i>hazarıye</i> tax, to provision dervish lodges for which the governor of Salonika was responsible, the <i>hazarıye</i> tax, collected by the governor of Salonika for his needs, ...
15	82, § 3	“... ket eylediklerinde...”	“... kat eylediklerinde...”
16	83, n. 37	“... Yeniçeri ... vürür ...”	“... yeniçeri ... vitrud ...”
17	83, § 2	At this point the problem in Karaferye can be connected with the issue of Albanian presence in the region.	At this point the Ottoman authorities connected the problem in Karaferye with the issue of Albanian presence in the region.
18	84, n. 44	document no. 18 / document no. 161	entry no. 18 / entry no. 16
19	84, § 2	..., Mustafa borrowed money ..., then terrorized them for its repayment.	..., Mustafa borrowed money ..., then Hasan terrorized them for its repayment.
20	85, § 2	... an examination ... provides no evidence an examination ... provided no evidence ...
21	85, § 2	It is noteworthy, too, that the cooperation between Mustafa and a Christian did not sound unlikely to the authorities, even if the claim proved not to be true.	It is also worth noting the cooperation between Mustafa and a Christian, which did not sound unlikely to the authorities, even if the claim proved not to be true.
22	86, n. 55	Quaert	Quaert
23	87, n. 56	Hacımehtemedağazade	Hacımehtemedağazade